

# **The United Nations and the Conflict in Burundi (2004-2006).**

## **A case of current peace keeping operations ?**

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# STRUCTURE

- Objectives
- Understanding the conflict dynamic in Burundi
- The path to peacekeeping: between ambiguity and enhancing regionalism
- Conclusion

# Objectives

- To provide some key points of the internal conflict in Burundi;
- To brief the different instruments for to meet the issues in the conflict
- To draw lessons

# Understanding the conflict in Burundi

## Structural factors:

- Small and landlocked countries (14 in Africa);
- Majority Hutu, Minority Tutsi
- Large parts of the population outside the country

# Understanding the conflict (ctd)

- **Access to independence (01 July 1962)**
  - The «*Rwanda social revolution*» in 1959
  - Outset of Kingdom, flow for thousands of Tutsi to neighboring countries;
  - Fear and Hope in Burundi;
  - Assassination of strong leaders
  - Lack of leadership

# Understanding the conflict (ctd)

- **Escalation: from elite struggle to mass killings**
- Impossibility to keep the political and legal heritage (Constitution of 1962)
- At State's level: unconstitutional power shift, military coup in 1966, 1976, 1987, 1996
- At social and group's level: civil war and judiciary trials, in 1965, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1988, 1993-2003

# Understanding the conflict (ctd)

## How to end the cycle of violence?

In addressing two main questions:

- ✓ Legitimacy of the power and
- ✓ To ensure the end of political violence  
(to address key issues related to economy, education, poverty, health care, decentralization, etc)

# The path to peace keeping

- **Democratization process in June 1993:**
  - Power shift to Hutu without transition and accommodation after decades of fear and hatred discourses,
  - Military coup on 21 October 1993 and escalation
  - Fight between government troops (seen as Tutsi) and different rebels groups (mainly Hutu)



# The path to PK (ctd)

## Peacemaking initiatives (october 1993-1995):

- ✓ Mostly initiated by the OAU and backed by UN resolutions;
- ✓ Direct mediation through the SG of the OAU (the context for the OAU)
- ✓ **Objectives:**
  - To end violence and
  - to ensure the return to democratic process

# The path to PK (ctd)

- Nomination of UN Secretary General Special Representative in Burundi in November 1993, in 1994,
- Difficult to accommodate the situation: mistrust from military chiefs, government and tutsi leaders
- New UN SG SRB in 1997 (untill last year)

# The path to PK (ctd)

## The military instrument:

- Project to send 180 troops by the Central Organ of the OAU
- With the objective «*to establish an International Force of Stabilization and Confidence Building*»
- Instead: «*Observation Mission to Re-establish Confidence in Burundi*» (OMIB / MIOB)
- 47 military observers (on 05 February 1994)

# The path to PK (ctd)

- Dialogue between UN/OAU representative with all social sectors (government, military, organizations of civil society, religious leaders etc);

## **Outcome:**

- Situation under control despite on going violence and
- Confidence-building and reconciliation between army and government, channel of communication between parties

# The path to PK (ctd)

## The (sub) regional peace initiative (July 1995)

- ✓ To provide common position on the Burundi conflict and towards all parties
- ✓ Political support to ongoing peacemaking initiatives;
- ✓ Pressure on parties to respect OAU recommendations

# The path to PK (ctd)

## Turning point: 25 June 1996 «*Arusha One*»

- ✓ Decision to send troops to help Burundian government and army to restore peace
- ✓ Military coup on 25 July 1996
- ✓ Reaction: Embargo on Burundi
- ✓ With conditions to restore elect parliament, to allow activities of political parties, acceptation of an all-inclusive negotiation

# The path to PK (ctd)

- Peace negotiations in Arusha (18 June 1998) and signing of the AAPRB on 28 August 2010
- Key outcomes: definition of conflict in Burundi (end of the «*meta-conflict*»);
- Enlarge the vision to other structural challenges of the country (good governance, economy, land issue, overpopulation etc.)
- Implementation: the interim government shall request the UN to establish an international peacekeeping force (IPKF) !!!!!

# The path to PK (ctd)

- **However:** No comprehensive ceasefire agreement (ongoing violence within the country, two rebel groups still reject the process)
- OAU asked rather the South Africa to deploy troops under the heading of **South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD)** in October 2001
- Mandate to protect political leaders returning from exile to participate to the implementation of the peace agreement



# The path to PKO (ctd)

- This request was the last main act of the former OAU before its replacement by the African Union (AU) on 26 May 2001
- 1 November 2001: Beginn of the first 18 months of transitional governement (Tutsi president; Hutu vice-president);
- Strategy to deal with rebel groups (or their wings): to bring the smaller ones on the process

# The path to PKO (ctd)

- Ceasefire agreement between the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD: Signing of a ceasefire agreement on 02 October 2002
- UN SC unwilling to deploy pkf
- Set of the **African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)**; start 2003
- **Mandate:**
  - ✓ To establish liaison between parties, monitoring and verifying the ceasefire

# The pat to PKO (ctd)

- ✓ Supervising the reform of the defense and police forces, the DDR;
- ✓ To ensure the establishment of UN peacekeeping mission;
- ✓ Contributing to the political and economic stability

## **Participation:**

Leading role of South Africa (up to 1600 men out of 3000 in 2004), Ethiopia and Mozambique; plus civilian and policemen

# UN PKO in Burundi

- Achievements: Implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement as scheduled in respect of the political and legal framework

## **THE UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE**

- The Dar es Salaam Conference on the Great Lakes in November 2003 recommended the deployment of a UN peace keeping force
- The UN SC authorized a UN Operation in Burundi (UNOB) starting from 1 June 2004 (Resolution 1545) on 21 May 2004

# UNPKO in Burundi (ctd)

- Mandate: to support peace process (electoral process; disarmament)
- August election: win of former rebel CNDD
- Talks between the elect government with the pending rebel group FNL
- Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement on 7 Septembre 2006, joint verification and monitoring mechanism involving the AU

# UNPKO in Burundi (ctd)

- Request from the burundian gouvernement to provide security for the former rebels combattants
- Approvment by the AU PSC the establishment of the **AU Special Task Force (AUSTF)** dominated by South Africa
- SA deployed its UNOB contingent (end with 31. 12. 2006): transfert of 786 troops to serve as the hardcore of the AUSTF (added to 8 observers form other african countries)
- 2009: End of the operations

# UN PKO in Burundi (ctd)

## Conclusion:

- ✓ Regionalism: to contribute to the «**African solutions to African conflicts**»;
- ✓ Less extra-african interventions in African conflicts since 1992 and the US Somalia intervention (1991-1995)
- ✓ Lack of coordination in the decision-making process and the implementation:
- ✓ Sensitivity to any conflict before taking any strategy for intervention

**Thank you**

**for your**

**ATTENTION!!!!**