A case of current peace keeping operations?

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Lusaka 23 September 2012
STRUCTURE

• Objectives
• Understanding the conflict dynamic in Burundi
• The path to peacekeeping: between ambiguity and enhancing regionalism
• Conclusion
Objectives

• To provide some key points of the internal conflict in Burundi;
• To brief the different instruments for to meet the issues in the conflict
• To draw lessons
Understanding the conflict in Burundi

Structural factors:

• Small and landlocked countries (14 in Africa);
• Majority Hutu, Minority Tutsi
• Large parts of the population outside the country
Understanding the conflict (ctd)

- Access to independence (01 July 1962)
  - The «Rwanda social revolution» in 1959
  - Outset of Kingdom, flow for thousands of Tutsi to neighboring countries;
  - Fear and Hope in Burundi;
  - Assassination of strong leaders
  - Lack of leadership
Understanding the conflict (ctd)

• Escalation: from elite struggle to mass killings
• Impossibility to keep the political and legal heritage (Constitution of 1962)
Understanding the conflict (ctd)

How to end the cycle of violence?
In addressing two main questions:
✓ Legitimacy of the power and
✓ To ensure the end of political violence
(to address key issues related to economy, education, poverty, health care, decentralization, etc)
The path to peace keeping

• Democratization process in June 1993:
  ➢ Power shift to Hutu without transition and accommodation after decades of fear and hatred discourses,
  ➢ Military coup on 21 October 1993 and escalation
  ➢ Fight between government troops (seen as Tutsi) and different rebels groups (mainly Hutu)
The path to PK (ctd)

Peacemaking initiatives (October 1993-1995):

- Mostly initiated by the OAU and backed by UN resolutions;
- Direct mediation through the SG of the OAU (the context for the OAU)

- Objectives:
  - To end violence and
  - to ensure the return to democratic process
The path to PK (ctd)

- Nomination of UN Secretary General Special Representative in Burundi in November 1993, in 1994,
- Difficult to accommodate the situation: mistrust from military chiefs, government and tutsi leaders
- New UN SG SRB in 1997 (until last year)
The path to PK (ctd)

The military instrument:

• Project to send 180 troops by the Central Organ of the OAU
• With the objective «to establish an International Force of Stabilization and Confidence Building»
• Instead: «Observation Mission to Re-establish Confidence in Burundi» (OMIB / MIOB)
• 47 military observers (on 05 February 1994)
The path to PK (ctd)

• Dialogue between UN/OAU representative with all social sectors (government, military, organizations of civil society, religious leaders etc);

Outcome:
• Situation under control despite on going violence and
• Confidence-building and reconciliation between army and government, channel of communication between parties
The path to PK (ctd)

The (sub) regional peace initiative (July 1995)

✓ To provide common position on the Burundi conflict and towards all parties

✓ Political support to ongoing peacemaking initiatives;

✓ Pressure on parties to respect OAU recommendations
The path to PK (ctd)

Turning point: 25 June 1996 «Arusha One»

- Decision to send troops to help Burundian government and army to restore peace
- Military coup on 25 July 1996
- Reaction: Embargo on Burundi
- With conditions to restore elect parliament, to allow activities of political parties, acceptation of an all-inclusive negotiation
The path to PK (ctd)

• Peace negotiations in Arusha (18 June 1998) and signing of the AAPRB on 28 August 2010
• Key outcomes: definition of conflict in Burundi (end of the «meta-conflict»);
• Enlarge the vision to other structural challenges of the country (good governance, economy, land issue, overpopulation etc.)
• Implementation: the interim government shall request the UN to establish an international peacekeeping force (IPKF) !!!!!
The path to PK (ctd)

• **However:** No comprehensive ceasefire agreement (ongoing violence within the country, two rebel groups still reject the process)

• OAU asked rather the South Africa to deploy troops under the heading of South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) in October 2001

• Mandate to protect political leaders returning from exile to participate to the implementation of the peace agreement
The path to PKO (ctd)

• This request was the last main act of the former OAU before its replacement by the African Union (AU) on 26 May 2001
• 1 November 2001: Beginn of the first 18 months of transitional government (Tutsi president; Hutu vice-president);
• Strategy to deal with rebel groups (or their wings): to bring the smaller ones on the process
The path to PKO (ctd)

• Ceasefire agreement between the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD: Signing of a ceasefire agreement on 02 October 2002
• UN SC unwilling to deploy pkf
• Set of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB); start 2003
• Mandate:
  ✓To establish liaison between parties, monitoring and verifying the ceasefire
The pat to PKO (ctd)

✓ Supervising the reform of the defense and police forces, the DDR;
✓ To ensure the establishment of UN peacekeeping mission;
✓ Contributing to the political and economic stability

**Participation:**
Leading role of South Africa (up to 1600 men out of 3000 in 2004), Ethiopia and Mozambique; plus civilian and policemen
UN PKO in Burundi

• Achievements: Implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement as scheduled in respect of the political and legal framework

THE UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE

➢ The Dar es Salaam Conference on the Great Lakes in November 2003 recommended the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force
➢ The UN SC authorized a UN Operation in Burundi (UNOB) starting from 1 June 2004 (Resolution 1545) on 21 May 2004
UNPKO in Burundi (ctd)

- Mandate: to support peace process (electoral process; disarmement)
- August election: win of former rebell CNDD
- Talks between the elect government with the pending rebel group FNL
- Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement on 7 Septembre 2006, joint verification and monitoring mechanism involving the AU
UNPKO in Burundi (ctd)

- Request from the burundian government to provide security for the former rebels combattants
- Approvement by the AU PSC the establishment of the **AU Special Task Force (AUSTF)** dominated by South Africa
- SA deployed its UNOB contingent (end with 31. 12. 2006): transfert of 786 troops to serve as the hardcore of the AUSTF (added to 8 observers form other african countries)
- 2009: End of the operations
UN PKO in Burundi (ctd)

Conclusion:
✓ Regionalism: to contribute to the «African solutions to African conflicts»;
✓ Lack of coordination in the decision-making process and the implementation:
✓ Sensitivity to any conflict before taking any strategy for intervention
Thank you
for your
ATTENTION!!!!