

# NEGOTIATING WITH AL-SHABAAAB

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13 February 2018

## INTRODUCTION

- Research commissioned by then-President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud followed by President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed of Somalia and the UN Special Representative, Michael Keating
- Conducted by FinnChurch Aid (FCA)
- Presented on 12/13 February 2018 in Mogadishu, Somalia
- Interviews conducted with:
  - 17 mid-management al-Shabaab members
  - 52 interviews with rank-and-file members

## CONCLUSION TO THE CONFLICT

How conflicts ended between 1968 - 2006:

- 43% through a political process
- 7% through military defeat

Role players

1. Somali Government – not formalized (preferred flexibility)

2. International Actors

- No negotiations
- Negotiation out of position of

3. Al-Shabaab Official position:


- Executive Council –
  - NO Negotiations
- Foreign fighters vs Somalis
- Leaders vs rank-and-file

4. Public


- 24% against military approach
- 76% negotiated solution

DIFFERENCE IN SAMPLES:  
LEADERS VS. RANK-AND-FILE


# AGE




# REASON FOR JOINING AL-SHABAAB



# EMOTION AT TIME OF JOINING




# STAY IN AL-SHABAAB






# REASON FOR DISENGAGING




# ACTORS FACILITATING DISENGAGEMENT




# POSITION OF LEADERS ON NEGOTIATIONS


# SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT (LEADERS)



# CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS



# EXTERNAL ROLE-PLAYERS



## POSITION OF SOMALIS

Interviews conducted by Saferworld in Gedo (Upper Juba Region) and Afgoye (Lower Shebelle):

1. Al-Shabaab provided justice that is:
  - i. Free
  - ii. Much fairer than statutory / customary systems
  - iii. Not linked to clan affiliation
2. Eradicate the use of khat
3. Less corrupt and more structured tax collection
4. Even wanted al-Shabaab to return to areas liberated by government forces

# CONCLUSION

Lessons from previous negotiation attempts:

1. Khartoum talks in 2006 between the TFG and ICU - Refusal of regional actors to accept the deal
2. Djibouti 2008/2009 Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia consisted to 'moderates' and 'hardliners' – negotiations exclusively with 'moderate' faction

Amnesty (60-days)

Classification and treatment of defectors

Funding for AMISOM - UNSC Resolution 2372 (August 2017) phased withdrawal program: +/- 21,000 AMISOM troops to leave Somalia by the end of 2020