South Africa’s military capability must …… be commensurate with South Africa’s international status, strategic posture and its inescapable continental leadership role. The Defence Force must make a vital and unique contribution that complements South Africa’s diplomatic efforts, enhances South Africa’s influence within wider international developments, and promotes regional security, specifically through the application of military capabilities to pressing African security issues.”

“The DOD will continue to consider the disjuncture between its current budget allocation, its level of ambition as articulated by Government through the SA Defence Review 2015, collective requirements of the UN, AU, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its Constitutional and Legislative mandate.” DOD 2017 in Parliament

Thomas Mandrup, Royal Danish Defence College and SIGLA, Stellenbosch University
Associate Professor, PHD
The SANDF RSA post 1994 - a backdrop

The Essential Military Dilemma: In effect, the most difficult military problem to resolve is that of establishing a security system, as inexpensive as possible in time of peace, capable of transforming itself very rapidly into a powerful force in case of the danger of aggression.

André Beaufre

- The SANDF role 1994: Primary tasks, no/limited PSO
- Peace dividend => 70,000 - tasks – oxymoron and contingency
- Goal: a transition from demilitarisation to NOD...
- Reduction of the SANDF from being at the centre, to just being another tool...
- The hidden closet...PSO tools/secondary
- Mbeki: SANDF: “the midwifes of peace”
- Nyanda. “No African Renaissance without the SANDF
- Cawthra – no army of peacekeepers/secondary
- Today - Defence in a developmental state
Sorry Mr. Chairman - National "security"

- South Africa’s national security is both tied to the regional/continental context, and to the domestic political/security reality – Mandela the biggest threat....+island of peace
- National Security vs Human Security – primary roles vs...?
- What is the role and capacity of the SANDF in creating security
- But ..Meyer - There must be either a greater budget allocation or a significant scaled-down level of ambition and commitment... In short, there are two strategic options available for government: budget must be determined by policy or, budget must drive policy.....why
Current balance/use of resources – HR costs even higher than de-pictured

Figure 9-28: Balancing the Funding Trajectory
DR 2015: SANDF in decline – ambitions vs. realities..being a peacetime army – de-modernisation process...?

- SANDF needs to contribute to the developmental state – jobs and training
- Underfunded and reforms – the structural issues 40/30/30 -70/20/10
- Foreign policy ambitions and reality – the political/fiscal process NR fund
- Political support for the reform projects
- Focus – technology and sustainability...DENEL R/D unsustainable, but...recent examples...
- Robustness vs peacekeeping – the post Mali + DRC experience
- Personnel – retirement and politics....
- Sorry Mr. Chairman....public awareness/support for the international ops..
- The health status of the force...
- The `pest-army`of the world: sexual abuse, corruption, and command & control?
- DR 2015 – policy ops. 2
Policy option 1-3 – from status quo..
**BROAD PROJECT PLANNING DELIVERABLES**

**ARREST THE DECLINE**

- **As Is**

**LONG TERM DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN**

- **As Is**

---

**DOD 20 YEAR PROJECT PLAN: 2 PRIMARY WORK PACKAGES**

- **Arresting the Decline**
- **Rebalancing Defence Capability**
- **Capacitating Defence Capability**
- **Responding to Military Threats**

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**REPORTS PROVIDE VALUE PROPOSITION FOCUS**

**DOD 20 YEAR PROJECT PLAN INFORMS SECRETARIAT AND MILITARY LONG-TERM PLANS**

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- **FULLY COSTED PLAN FOR MS1 COMPLETED BY MARCH/APRIL 2016**
- **FULLY COSTED PLAN COMPLETED BY MAY 2017**

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- **JANUARY 2016**
- **16/17 DOD APP ADJUSTMENTS**
SANDF current commitments

• The SANDF may be required to co-operate on a more regular basis with the South African Police Service (SAPS) to ensure domestic peace and security- an issues that was hotly debated amongst the generals – do we want to revert to that role?

• The resourced responsibility of the SANDF in terms of border safeguarding will be continued with the deployment of 15 sub-units during the FY2017/18 and will remain constant for the MTEF in support of the NSS

• Support for the/taking over from the SAPS in the Western Cape....

• Youth Leadership Development and Character-building Module and plans to train approximately 2 000 youths during the FY2017/18 through current departmental infrastructure and resources.

• During the FY2017/18 the SANDF deployment in peace support operations (PSOs) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) under the auspices of the United Nations Mission (MONUSCO) will continue with an Infantry Battalion plus supporting elements, supported by Rooivalk and Oryx helicopters. Selected specialist SANDF elements, amongst them combat and construction engineers, military observers and staff officers,

• Ops. Kobber...

• Mil. Diplomacy and cooperation – South Sudan the most recent ex., but ....CAR

• AU – APSA and ACIRC
The operations...lessons

• Boleas – Intelligence and inadequate force/mandate + planning
• Burundi 2001-2009 (bilateral...) discipline (3 month), mandate, political and economic support, African partners...exit strategy...Model for the ASF
• DR. Congo – Mandate, keeping operational, logistics, partners...and political support and priorities....SEA...
• CAR: Mission creep, international strategic competitions, limitations, African solutions, peace time armies fighting a war, intelligence..., logistics and training...200 vs a “division size force”, operational problems...first military capacity building ops.
• Future developments...expedtionary or prioritisation – equipment...ex. of deployment of ACIRC – Ratel badger
• Peace time army – funding and public awareness

25-03-2018
NON
A L'EXPLOITATION ET AUX ABUS SEXUELS
COMMIS PAR LE PERSONNEL DE LA MONUSCO

Pas de relations sexuelles avec des mineur(e)s et des prostitué(e)s
Pas de relations sexuelles en échange d'argent, de cadeaux, de biens, d'emploi et de services

Equipe de Conduite et Discipline (CDT)
E-mail : cdumonuc@un.org - Hotline : 081 890 7744
The military structures – ACIRC/RDC-Proxi, RDC, and the Brigade

• **Mechanism of AU** to intervene and respond quickly to crises (*African solutions*...)
• **Interim** until ASF (RDC) is in place (2016/17) – **has now been extended to end 2018/19** or when the ASF is fully operational
• Robust, full-bodied military force
• **Bde (+) strength** (5 x Mot Inf Bns, Cmbt Sup and Cmbt Svc Sup)
• Troop contribution by 12 x **Volunteering Nations (VN)**. Also referred to as ‘follow-up’ nations
• **90 days deployment** before AU/UN force takes over
• Deploy within **14 days**

• **Intervention Concept:**
  
  ‘**Robust form of peace keeping**, capable of responding **swiftly** and **rapidly** to crises while other stake holders work for a political and/or civilian peacekeeping solution(s)’

• **Role 1**: ‘Immediate control of violence’ (Mil)
• **Role 2**: ‘Facilitation of inter-cultural dialogue within/between communities to promote durable peace and stability’ (Pol)
## Force Levels and Contribution of Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Level</th>
<th>Main Equipment</th>
<th>Personnel Strength</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>431 Joint Task Force HQ</td>
<td>8 x Ratel Comd</td>
<td>199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SA Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Mot Inf Bn</td>
<td>103 x Caspir APCs</td>
<td>904</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Armd C Sqn (-)</td>
<td>8 x Rooikat Armd C</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x ZT3A2 Tp</td>
<td>4 x Ratel Msl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Mech Inf Pl</td>
<td>4 x Ratel 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Arty Bty</td>
<td>8 x 120mm Mor</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Eng Tp</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Sig Sqn (-)</td>
<td>Radio and tele comms</td>
<td>107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Comp Tac Int Tp</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,663</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Force Levels and Contribution of Resources (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Level</th>
<th>Main Equipment</th>
<th>Personnel Strength</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SAAF</strong></td>
<td><strong>Air assets</strong>&lt;br&gt;Tactical Airfield Unit&lt;br&gt;2 x Rooivalk CSH&lt;br&gt;2 x A109 LUH&lt;br&gt;2 x Oryx MTH&lt;br&gt;2 x C130 a/c&lt;br&gt;UAVs (TBC)&lt;br&gt;Air-ambulances (C130; PC12; Citation 550)</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Force Levels and Contribution of Resources (3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Level</th>
<th>Main Equipment</th>
<th>Personnel Strength</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SA Navy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Maritime assets</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 x Patrol Boats</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>Inclusive of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SAMHS</strong></td>
<td><strong>Medical Task Group (+)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L1 Med Post</td>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 x Samil 20 Ambulance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 x Mfezi Ambulance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DI</strong></td>
<td>2 x Tac UAV</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>TBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MP Div</strong></td>
<td>1 x MP Pl</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 x Caspir/Mamba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>368</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,411</strong></td>
<td>SANDF contingent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Impact of an **ACIRC** Deployment on other SANDF Commitments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>What/Where?</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Op CORONA</td>
<td>RSA border safeguarding</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>6 x Month rotations; Utilisation of Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op CORDITE</td>
<td>UNAMID - Sudan</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>12 Month rotation <em>(RSA contribution ended)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op MISTRAL</td>
<td>MONUSCO - DRC</td>
<td>Withdrawal of helicopters</td>
<td>FIB Bn continue ‘as is’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op COPPER</td>
<td>Anti-piracy in the Mozambique Channel</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op PROSPER</td>
<td>Internal stability support to SAPS</td>
<td>None (for now)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDF Force</td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
<td>Withdrawal of log support vehicles and other equipment/capacity/commodities from training bases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SANDF pledge to SADC BRIGADE/SSF

• Percentage Compliance with the South African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force Pledge. The DOD maintained full compliance (100%) wrt the SADC pledge.

• Initiated in 2008 and declared operational in 2009 – by 2015 the former head of the force said – I do not know if it is operational? Evaluation says yes, but..no real inspection? Today...?

• Tested at the AMANI II exercise, or was it

• To be validated in the coming months – the talk is that ops capability not ready for both ACIRC and ASF – the old critique coming true?

• Concept: 5000-6000 on standby – 30-90 days

• RDC concept (included into the structure now) – 14 days to deploy 2500 troops,

• But Maputo 2020 reform-process under way
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA ARMY</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Brigade Tactical Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Parachute Airborne Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Motorised Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 120 mm Mortar Battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Composite Engineer Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Tactical Intelligence Troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Integrated Signal Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Composite Maintenance Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA AIR FORCE</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Medium Lift Helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Light Lift Helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Medium Lift Transport Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Mobile Air Operations Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA NAVY</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Combat Support Vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Diving Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Harbour Patrol Boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Maritime Reaction Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMHS</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Level II Field Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Level IV Military Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chemical, Biological and Hazardous Materials Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Provost Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 Military Observers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>